

AD-A149 522

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM(U) FEDERAL AVIATION  
ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF CIVIL.

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
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
AD-A149 522

# Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of The Civil Aviation Security Program

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January 1 - June 30, 1984

DMB FILE COPY



Washington, D.C. 20591

October 1984

Report of the Administrator  
of the Federal Aviation Administration  
to the United States Congress  
pursuant to Section 315(a)  
of the Federal Aviation Act  
of 1958

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## Technical Report Documentation Page

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15. Supplementary Notes  This report is required by Section 315 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958		14. Sponsoring Agency Code
16. Abstract  -This report provides details on the effectiveness of security screening of passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. It also provides a statistical summary of aircraft hijackings and alleged violations of Federal Aviation regulations pertaining to security screening.		
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U.S Department  
of Transportation  
Federal Aviation  
Administration

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20591

OCT 11 1984

The Honorable George Bush  
President of the Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to forward the Federal Aviation Administration's Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period January 1 through June 30, 1984, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

During this reporting period, there were three U.S. air carrier hijackings. This low number of hijackings clearly attests to the success of the airline passenger screening system in the United States. In contrast, there were six foreign air carrier aircraft hijacked outside the United States during this same period. Most of these hijackings can be attributed to weak or non-existent passenger screening procedures.

A report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,

Donald D. Engen  
Administrator

Enclosure





US Department  
of Transportation  
Federal Aviation  
Administration

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20591

OCT 11 1984

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS . . . . .	1
II. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	2
III. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS. . . . .	2
IV. BASIC POLICIES - SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS . . . . .	3
V. PASSENGER SCREENING. . . . .	3
VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT . . . . .	4
VII. OUTLOOK. . . . .	5

EXHIBITS

1. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft
2. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. and Foreign Aircraft
3. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft
4. Actual Hijackings and Prevented Hijacking Attempts
5. Basic Policies
6. Scope and Effectiveness
7. Airline Passenger Screening Results
8. Compliance and Enforcement

I. EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

1. THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD JANUARY-JUNE 1984.
2. OVER 367.4 MILLION PERSONS WERE PROCESSED THROUGH U.S. PASSENGER CHECKPOINTS. THERE WERE 1,325 FIREARMS DETECTED WITH 565 RELATED ARRESTS.
3. WORLDWIDE, 9 HIJACKINGS OCCURRED (8 SUCCESSFUL) AGAINST SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS. THREE WERE AGAINST U.S. AIRLINES (3 SUCCESSFUL).
4. OF THE 6 FOREIGN AIR CARRIER HIJACKINGS, 3 OCCURRED ON DOMESTIC FLIGHTS.
5. THERE WERE 2 U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT HIJACKED DURING THIS PERIOD, BOTH WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.
6. ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS BY AIR CARRIERS, AIRPORTS, AND INDIVIDUALS TOTALED 1,144.
7. OF THE 1,144 ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS, 135 RESULTED IN CIVIL PENALTIES TOTALING \$79,934.

## II. INTRODUCTION

This is the 20th Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period January 1 - June 30, 1984, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. This report presents a concise picture of the national situation with regard to the effectiveness of the procedures utilized to screen visitors and airline passengers and their carryon items prior to boarding scheduled and public charter flights.

## III. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

A certificate holder is defined in Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 108 as a person holding a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operating certificate when that person engages in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations or both. To differentiate between air carrier and general aviation hijackings, all hijackings of certificate holder aircraft are designated as air carrier hijackings.

There were 3 U.S. scheduled air carrier hijackings during this reporting period. All 3 of these hijackings were successful. There were 2 hijackings of U.S. general aviation aircraft during this period; both were unsuccessful. The overall record of U.S. general aviation hijackings has been included in this report. While the low number of total hijackings is encouraging, unfortunately 2 of the 3 air carrier hijackings which were successful ended in Cuba.

During this same 6-month period, 6 foreign air carrier aircraft were hijacked, 5 of these hijackings were successful, and in 3 cases, (2 successful, 1 unsuccessful), the incidents occurred aboard aircraft which were on scheduled domestic flights.

(See Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)

The number of hijacking attempts or other crimes against civil aviation prevented or deterred by airline and airport security procedures cannot be determined with certainty. However, the number of firearms detected at passenger screening points under suspicious circumstances and the number of individuals apprehended while attempting to gain unauthorized access to aircraft indicate that some of these individuals were intent on committing a crime. Although evidence was not strong enough to identify any specific incidents during this reporting period as prevented hijackings, the large quantity of weapons detected during the passenger screening and the number of related arrests support a reasonable assumption that criminal acts against civil aviation were prevented. Since 1973, an estimated 111

possible hijackings or related crimes may have been prevented--strong indication of the effectiveness of the security measures in use.

(See Exhibit 4)

#### IV. BASIC POLICIES - SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The basic policy guiding the development and implementation of U.S. procedures on aircraft passenger security screening is the sharing of principal responsibilities among airlines, airports, local communities, the Federal Government, and the passengers. This concept has produced a cooperative and effective program which has provided the capability of addressing and meeting current security needs as well as responding to the changing level and nature of threats against civil aviation. Airline and airport security measures continue to provide increased safety and protection to air travelers, aircraft crewmembers, air carrier aircraft, and air carrier servicing airports.

(See Exhibits 5 and 6)

#### V. PASSENGER SCREENING

Airline passenger screening procedures which include 100 percent inspection of all passengers and their carryon items were initiated in 1973. During the more than 11 years these screening systems have been in operation, there has been a dramatic overall decrease in the number of hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft. Since the initiation of these procedures, there have been 94 air carrier aircraft hijackings. This amounts to an average of between 8 and 9 per year. The 3 hijackings during this reporting period, 2 of which ended in Cuba, represent a large decrease from the 11 hijackings which occurred during the second half of 1983, and 7 hijackings which occurred during the first half of 1983. If this low rate of hijackings continues through the second half of 1984, this would be the lowest number of hijackings in any year since 1973.

Detection of firearms and explosives or incendiary devices is the primary objective of passenger screening activities. These items are of particular concern and pose the greatest security threat to civil aviation. The FAA's analysis of screening checkpoint activity includes the recording and study of the number of firearms and explosives or incendiary devices detected and false threats received, as well as related information received concerning arrests of individuals involved. Results of U.S. screening activities for the first 6 months of 1984 are detailed below.

There were over 367.4 million persons processed through 386 airports during the first half of 1984. A total of 1,325 firearms were detected. X-ray inspection accounted for 1,265 (95 percent) of the firearms

detected, 47 (4 percent) were detected by use of the metal detector, and 13 (1 percent) were detected as the result of physical search. The total firearms detected is 9 percent higher than the average of 1,217 firearms detected during the preceding 8 reporting periods and 7 percent lower than the 1,421 firearms detected during the last half of 1983. During this reporting period, there were 4 military explosive/incendiary devices detected by x-ray inspection of carryon items.

There were 565 persons arrested at screening points for carrying firearms. This represents a decrease of 37 (7 percent) over the average of 602 arrests for the preceding 8 reporting periods and a decrease of 84 (13 percent) from the 649 which occurred during the last 6 months of 1983. The 565 arrests were made at screening points at 98 airports throughout the United States. Screening activities are analyzed within airport categories according to the number of persons screened per year as follows: Category I - 2 million or more; Category II - 500,000 to 2 million; and Categories III and IV - under 500,000. Passenger screening is conducted at Category IV airports only when deplanement into a sterile area at another airport is desired. Of the 565 arrests, 460 (81 percent) occurred at 48 Category I airports (e.g., Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois); 79 (14 percent) occurred at 29 Category II airports (e.g., Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, and Colorado Springs, Colorado); and the remaining 26 (5 percent) occurred at 21 Categories III and IV airports (e.g., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Roanoke, Virginia). Historically, well over 50 percent of the persons arrested for attempting to carry firearms through passenger screening systems have been fined, placed in confinement, or have been subjected to other disciplinary action. In addition to criminal prosecutive actions by Federal and local jurisdictions, the FAA may take civil action against individuals who without proper authorization attempt to carry a firearm or explosive/incendiary device through screening checkpoints. During this reporting period, 971 investigations of individuals were completed and \$34,534 in civil penalties were collected.

The equipment primarily used to conduct screening operations consists of walk-through weapons detectors for the screening of passengers and, at high-volume screening checkpoints, x-ray inspection systems for carryon articles. At most stations, hand-held metal detection devices are used as backup support for the walk-through weapon detection devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, has ongoing research and developmental projects geared toward producing new screening equipment which will improve detection capabilities and minimize passenger inconvenience.

(See Exhibits 7 and 8)

#### VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

The FAA is responsible for ensuring compliance by airlines, airports, and individuals with the various security requirements imposed by pertinent FAR's. The basic purpose of these requirements is to assure safety and

security for airline passengers and crewmembers. Alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal actions taken.

Success in achieving compliance by all concerned is primarily dependent upon the degree of cooperation between industry personnel and the persons responsible for enforcement of the regulations. Airlines and airport operators generally take prompt corrective action on their own when a potential problem is recognized thus reducing the need for more extensive enforcement action. In instances where an investigation of an alleged violation of the regulations indicates lack of compliance, administrative or legal action may be necessary. These actions take the form of Warnings, Letters of Correction, or assessment of civil penalties. During the first half of 1984, 1,144 investigations of alleged security violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 135 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$79,934 were collected, and in 915 cases, administrative corrective action was taken. In the remaining cases, the alleged violations were not substantiated. The total number of investigations completed during this 6-month reporting period represents approximately a 35 percent decrease over the second half of 1983.


#### VII. OUTLOOK

Over the past several years, there has been a continuing improvement in civil aviation security measures throughout the world; however, the high number of hijackings over the years indicate the hijack threat persists and that continuing civil aviation security measures remain necessary.

Several explosions have occurred against civil aviation overseas. Three detonations occurred aboard aircraft inflight and 2 occurred at airports, resulting in death to 112 persons and injury to over 50 persons. There is a growing concern that acts of sabotage against civil aviation may become a primary threat as opposed to the threat of hijacking.

Despite the preventive measures taken, it is believed that civil aviation, because it is a dramatic target, will remain tempting and vulnerable to the mentally disturbed, criminal, and terrorist elements. There is, however, an effective security system in place capable of meeting this threat with sufficient flexibility to allow appropriate increase or decrease in security safeguards.


With continued cooperation from representatives of the airlines, airports, and the traveling public, the United States will continue to be successful in keeping civil aviation safe from criminal acts.





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Administration**

## Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft<sup>1/</sup>



HIJACKING BY YEAR										TOTALS									
TOTAL	1930	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	TOTALS
TOTAL	25	40	25	25	27	1	3	6	2	5	8	11	21	7	9	18	3	236	
SUCCESSFUL	16	33	17	11	8	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	13	1	3	13	3	123
INCOMPLETE <sup>2</sup>	2	1	4	8	14	1	1	1	1	0	3	4	5	3	0	1	3	0	51
UNSUCCESSFUL	7	6	4	6	5	0	2	5	1	2	4	2	5	6	5	2	0	62	

U.S. Air carrier Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1984

Date 1984	Airline/Fit/ Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination/ Objective
2/11	AA-658/B-727	152	Port Au Prince, Haiti	New York, N.Y. (WFO)
3/27	PI-451-B-737	59	Charleston, S.C.	Cuba
3/28	DL-357-B-727	26	New Orleans, LA.	Cuba


EXHIBIT 1

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## Hijacking Attempts on U.S. And Foreign Aircraft\*



\*Includes General Aviation Aircraft


As of: 7/1/84

EXHIBIT 2



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## Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft



<sup>1</sup> Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit."

General Aviation Aircraft Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1984

CY	Prior 1969	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	TOTALS
<b>TOTAL</b>	9	0	2	2	4	1	4	6	2	1	5	2	1	1	1	1	2	<b>44</b>
<b>Successful</b>	9(100%)	0	1(50%)	1(50%)	2(50%)	1(100%)	3(75%)	4(67%)	0	0	2(40%)	2(100%)	0	1(100%)	1(100%)	0	0	2(61%)
<b>Incomplete<sup>1</sup></b>	0	0	1(50%)	1(50%)	0	0	1(25%)	2(33%)	1(50%)	0	2(40%)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0(18%)
<b>Unsuccessful</b>	0	0	0	0	2(50%)	0	0	0	1(50%)	1(100%)	0	1(20%)	0	1(100%)	0	0	1(100%)	9(21%)


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EXHIBIT 3



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**Actual Hijackings & Prevented Hijacking Attempts - 1974 to Present**  
*(U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft)*



**PREVENTED ATTEMPTS:** Incidents in which it appeared the individuals involved intended to hijack an aircraft but were prevented from doing so by security procedures.

As of: 7/1/84

EXHIBIT 4



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**Federal Aviation  
Administration**

## **Civil Aviation Security Basic Policies**

<u>PROGRAM ELEMENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
AIR CARRIERS	SECURE TRAVEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS</li><li>● SCREEN PASSENGERS, CARRY-ON ITEMS</li><li>● SECURE BAGGAGE, CARGO PROCEDURES</li><li>● PROTECT AIRCRAFT</li></ul>
AIRPORTS	SECURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS</li><li>● PROTECT AIR OPERATIONS AREA</li><li>● PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT</li></ul>
FAA	LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THREAT</li><li>● PRESCRIBE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS</li><li>● COORDINATE SECURITY OPERATIONS</li><li>● PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</li><li>● ENFORCE REGULATIONS</li></ul>
USERS	PROGRAM COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● SECURITY FUNDED AS OPERATING COST OF SYSTEM</li></ul>

EXHIBIT 5



US Department  
of Transportation  
**Federal Aviation  
Administration**

## **Civil Aviation Security Scope and Effectiveness 1973-1984**

- Almost 5.5 Billion Persons Screened
- Almost 7 Billion Pieces of Carry-on Items Inspected
- Over 30,000 Firearms Detected
- Over 12,000 Related Arrests
- 111 Hijackings or Related Crimes May Have Been Prevented by Airline and Airport Security Measures

As of: 7/1/84

EXHIBIT 6



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**Civil Aviation Security  
Airline Passenger Screening Results  
January 1979-June 1984**

	1979 Jan-June	1979 July-Dec	1980 Jan-June	1980 July-Dec	1981 Jan-June	1981 July-Dec	1982 Jan-June	1982 July-Dec	1983 Jan-June	1983 July-Dec	1984 Jan-June
<b>Persons Screened (Millions)</b>	285.7	306.8	289.9	295.1	294.4	304.1	319.5	310.7	313.9	395.2	367.4
<b>Weapons Detected</b>											
Firearms	990	1171	1002	1020	971	1284	1286	1390	1363	1421	1325
(1) Handguns	902	1060	940	938	915	1209	1243	1316	1303	1331	1265
(2) Long Guns	29	26	17	19	7	37	16	41	22	45	31
(3) Other	59	85	45	63	49	38	27	33	38	45	29
Explosive Incendiary Devices	3	0	1	7	8	3	0	1	4	0	4
<b>Persons Arrested</b>											
For Carriage of Firearms	469	591	520	511	534	653	651	663	633	649	565
Explosives	21	26	11	21	34	15	21	6	7	27	6
For Giving False Information											

Source Reports of Passenger Screening Activities at U.S. Airports

EXHIBIT 7

As of: 7/1/84



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Administration**

## Civil Aviation Security *Compliance and Enforcement Actions*

		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1980		1981		1982		1983	
<b>U.S. AIR CARRIERS</b>																							
Warnings		599		276		286		283		154		465		164		231		58					
Letters of Correction		514		109		145		102		100		52		98		51		25					
Non Enforcement Actions		273		61		65		49		55		38		44		52		13					
Civil Penalties (Amount)		241 (\$210,700)		43 (\$66,700)		30 (\$23,300)		26 (\$18,075)		48 (\$42,875)		35 (\$72,547)		28 (\$10,508)		31 (\$26,861)		34 (\$41,400)					
Investigations Closed		1,627		489		506		460		357		340		334		31		130					
Investigations Pending		61		48		80		112		115		91		~		~		138					
<b>FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS</b>																							
Warnings		0		0		0		14		4		3		2		3		1					
Letters of Correction		12		11		6		6		4		0		2		1		0					
Non Enforcement Actions		5		2		3		3		15		1		2		2		0					
Civil Penalties (Amount)		0		0		0		0		0		2 (\$25,000)		0		0		2 (\$4,000)					
Investigations Closed		17		13		14		23		23		6		6		6		2					
Investigations Pending		2		12		15		5		5		2		4		4		3					
<b>AIRPORTS</b>																							
Warnings Issued		266		137		168		80		83		63		59		57		21					
Letters of Correction		259		53		65		53		91		14		21		9		12					
Non Enforcement Actions		50		23		20		12		23		19		9		18		7					
Civil Penalties (Amount)		50 (\$32,600)		12 (\$3,500)		11 (\$7,500)		19 (\$15,150)		13 (\$15,600)		23 (\$21,675)		8 (\$6,300)		8 (\$7,250)		0					
Investigations Closed		625		225		264		164		210		119		97		92		40					
Investigations Pending		23		29		69		48		25		18		14		16							
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>																							
Administrative Corrections		28		81		68		617		1,469		2,168		2,267		2,474		798					
Non Enforcement Actions		43		24		18		87		162		209		161		207		74					
Civil Penalties (Amount)		2 (\$375)		4 (\$2,050)		9 (\$1,925)		70 (\$11,300)		155 (\$27,210)		231 (\$49,410)		114 (\$28,095)		270 (\$84,190)		99 (\$34,534)					
Investigations Closed		73		109		95		774		1,786		2,608		2,542		2,951		971					
Investigations Pending		14		45		392		475		398		483		550		550		698					

**As of: 7/1/84**

EXHIBIT 8

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